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To Defer or Not to Defer: When Must aCourt
Honor an Administrative Agency's
Interpretation of Its Own Regulations?
by Patrick C. McGinley

Patrick C. McGinley is a professor
of law at the West Virginia
University College of Law, Box
6130, Morgantown, WV26506;
(304) 293-6823.

One of the most contentious debates
in administrative law relates to the
extent to which a court must defer
to an administrative agency's interpretation of the laws and regulations
it administers. This case permits the
Supreme Court to distinguish more
clearly those situations requiring
judicial deference from those in
which such deference is not
required, thereby clarifying its
prior decisions on the subject.

ISSUES
1. Was the Secretary of Health and
Human Services authorized to promulgate a rule amortizing the reimbursement of a Medicare provider's
debt-refinancing costs instead of
reimbursing those costs in the year
in which they were incurred and
reported to Medicare?
2. If so, is the rule, nonetheless
invalid, because it is a legislative
rule and, as such, was not promulgated in accordance with the Federal Administrative Procedure Act?

health-care provider participating in
the federal Medicare program, a
program providing health-care coverage for the elderly and disabled.
In 1972, the Hospital issued $7.6
million in bonds to finance capital
improvements. In 1982, the Hospital
issued another $10.4 million in
bonds for the same purpose. The
interest rates payable on both bond
issues were relatively high, reaching
12.5 percent in some cases.
In 1985, Guernsey participated in a
third bond issue in the amount of
$15.38 million. The purpose of the
third issue was to refinance the first
two issues in order to take advantage of lower interest rates. By refinancing, the Hospital expected to
save approximately $12 million in
debt service payments over the life
of the two prior bond issues.

at a

Glance
Shalala v. Guernsey
Memorial Hospital
presents the question of
how much deference a
court must give to an
administrative agency's
interpretation of its own
regulations. In prior
cases, the Supreme Court
has indicated that an
agency's interpretation of
its own regulations is generally entitled to substan-

Because the refinancing occurred in
1985, Guernsey was required by
applicable Medicare regulations to
report the refinancing according to
generally accepted accounting prin(Continued on page 55)

tial deference. This case
presents an opportunity
for the Court to delineate
more precisely those situations in which deference
is required from situations in which it is not.

DoNvA E. SALALA, SECRETARY
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
v. GUERNSEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

FACTS
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Guernsey Memorial Hospital
("Guernsey" or the "Hospital") is a
nonprofit, acute-care hospital located in Cambridge, Ohio, and is a
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ciples often referred to as "GAAPs."
Under GAAPs, Guernsey was entitled to charge the full amount of its
refinancing costs - $672,581 - as
an expense for 1985, the year in
which the expense was incurred.
Accordingly, Guernsey included
$672,581 as an operating cost for
1985 and asked for reimbursement
of a portion of this amount, some
$314,000, under the Medicare
program.
Following applicable Medicare regulations, Guernsey's request for reimbursement was channeled through a
fiscal intermediary, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield/Community Mutual
Insurance Company ("Blue Cross").
(The Department of Health and
Human Services does not handle the
day-to-day administration of many
of its programs such as Medicare
but, instead, contracts with insurance companies or others with the
appropriate expertise to provide
necessary administrative services.
Contract providers of administrative
services are known as fiscal intermediaries and, in the case of Medicare
for example, act for the Department
in determining which costs of providing medical care are covered by
Medicare and which are not.)
Using Medicare program guidelines
contained in Medicare's Provider
Reimbursement Manual ("Reimbursement Manual"), Blue Cross
determined that the refinancing loss
was not reimbursable in full for 1985
as a cost attributable only to 1985.
In Blue Cross's view, the loss was
required to be amortized, i.e., spread
out, over a period of years.
Guernsey appealed this determination to the Provider Reimbursement
Review Board (the "Board"), which
overruled Blue Cross's decision.
The Board was, in turn, reversed by
the Administrator of the Healthcare
Financing Administration (the
"Administrator"). The Administrator

concluded that Guernsey's refinancing loss would have to be amortized.
Guernsey, not giving up, appealed
the Administrator's decision to the
United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio. The district court rejected Guernsey's arguments and affirmed the decision of
the Administrator. 796 F. Supp. 283
(S.D. Ohio, 1992).
The Hospital sought further judicial
review in an appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit which reversed. The Sixth
Circuit held that applicable
Medicare regulations required the
use of GAAPs in determining the
total amount of the Hospital's reimbursable costs for its refinancing and
that, by applying GAAPS, all such
costs should be reimbursed in 1985
rather than being amortized over a
period of years. 996 F. 2d 830
(6th Cir. 1993).
The Sixth Circuit further held that
the the Reimbursement Manual,
which was the basis for denying
Guernsey's reimbursement request,
was being utilized by the Administrator as a legislative rule in violation of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act (the "APA"). The APA
provides that legislative rules rules having the force and effect of
a law - are valid only if they are
adopted through a public notice and
comment procedure.
The Sixth Circuit rejected the
Administrator's claim that Section
233 of the Reimbursement Manual,
the specific provision relied on to
reject Guernsey's reimbursement
request, was merely an interpretive
rule. (An interpretive rule does not
have the force and effect of law but,
rather, is a rule that simply explains
existing law and regulations. As
such, an interpretive rule is not subject to the APA's requirement of public notice and comment.) Thus, the

Sixth Circuit held that the
Administrator, acting on behalf of
the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (the "Secretary"), had
proceeded unlawfully by using
Section 233 as a rule with the force
and effect of law even though the
rule had not gone through the
required public notice and comment. 5 U.S.C § 553.
CASE ANALYSIS
Reduced to its essence, the conflict
between the parties in this case is
over the time when admittedly reimbursable heath-care provider costs
are actually paid by the Department
of Health and Human Services (the
"Department"). The Secretary
argues that the Department's rules
and regulations clearly require that
the costs of bond refinancing be
amortized over a period of years.
Guernsey disagrees and asserts that
both the Department's own regulations and GAAPs mandate that costs
be reimbursed in the year that
GAAPs consider them to have been
incurred, not amortizing them over
several years as Section 233 of the
Secretary's Reimbursement Manual
instructs. Interestingly, the Hospital
concedes that the amortization rule
utilized by the Secretary in this case
is within her authority to adopt; it
simply maintains that Section 233
was not adopted in accordance with
the APA's rule-making requirements
and, thus, is unlawful as applied in
this case.
This case calls on the Supreme
Court to decide what the Department's regulations mean and, in construing those regulations, whether or
not to give deference to the Department's interpretation of its own
regulations. Finally, assuming that
Section 233 of the Reimbursement
Manual takes precedence over an
apparently conflicting statutory
requirement with respect to reimbursable costs, the Court may

Issue No. 2

decide if Section 233 was, or should
have been, adopted in accordance
with the APA.
The Secretary argues simply that the
interpretation she has given to her
Department's own regulations is a
reasonable one and is consistent
with the Department's statutory
mandate. Accordingly, the Secretary
contends that the Sixth Circuit was
required by a long line of Supreme
Court cases to give her interpretation controlling weight. See, e.g.,
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Stinson
v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913
(1993). Such deference, the
Secretary asserts, is particularly
appropriate in this case, where the
question of interpretation arises
under "a complex and highly technical regulatory program" entailing
"significant expertise, and ... the
exercise of judgment grounded in
policy concerns." Pauley v. Beth
Energy Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
2524 (1991).
The Secretary further maintains that
neither the applicable Medicare
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395, nor the
regulations relied on by Guernsey,
42 C.F.R. §§ 413.20, 413.24, and
413.5, require her to utilize GAAPs
in deciding the appropriate time to
reimburse health-care providers for
costs incurred in providing care to
Medicare subscribers.
The Secretary asserts that, while
agency regulations require hospitals
such as Guernsey to use GAAPs and
while GAAPs require a hospital to
report reimbursable costs in the year
the costs were incurred as that term
is used by accountants, she, as
Secretary, is not required to follow
GAAPs in designating when reimbursement of such costs will be
made. Thus, in deciding when to pay
reimbursable costs, the Secretary
argues that both the Medicare act

and the Department's regulations
implementing the act afford her the
discretion to take into account considerations other than the concerns
advanced by accounting experts
through GAAPs.
In requiring that Guernsey's refinancing costs be amortized over a
period of years, the Secretary contends that the Department properly
attempted to make the timing of
reimbursement reflect the reasonable cost of services furnished to
Medicare beneficiaries attributable
to a given year. The Secretary
asserts that this approach is intended to avoid the statutorily prohibited
subsidization of non-Medicare
patient services by Medicare funds.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) and (i).
The Secretary further maintains that
the guidelines set forth in Section
233 of the Reimbursement Manual
are merely interpretive rules, i.e.,
they simply explain Medicare
provider legislation and regulations
without imposing new substantive
requirements beyond those found in
existing law and regulations.
Moreover, the Secretary argues that
the Department's interpretation of
applicable regulations relating to
reimbursement and to the applicability of GAAPs has been consistent
since the inception of the Medicare
reimbursement program.
Guernsey responds by arguing that
the Secretary's interpretation of the
Department's Medicare reimbursement rules is not entitled to the
usual deference given by courts to a
Department's own interpretation of
its regulations. The Hospital asserts
that the Department has taken significantly conflicting positions
regarding the proper interpretation
of its reimbursement regulations
over the years and, therefore, that
its current interpretation should not
be given judicial deference.

Guernsey also asserts that the
Sixth Circuit was correct in holding
that the plain language of the
Medicare regulations contained in
42 C.F.R. §§ 413.20, 413.24, and
413.5 require the Department to
utilize GAAPs in reporting the costs
to be reimbursed to a health-care
provider. In support of its position
on this point, the Hospital emphasizes that each of the federal court
cases addressing the issue of the
proper timing of Medicare's reimbursement of refinancing costs
have rejected the same arguments
the Secretary makes in this case.
See, e.g., Mother Frances Hosp. v.
Shalala, 15 F.3d 423 (5th Cir.
1994); Graham Hosp. Ass'n v.
Sullivan, 832 F. Supp. 1235 (C.D.
Ill. 1993); Baptist Hosp., East v.
Sullivan, 767 F. Supp. 139 (W.D.
Ky. 1991); Ravenswood Hosp.
Medical Ctr.v. Schweiker, 622 F.
Supp. 338 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
The Hospital next focuses on the
Secretary's reliance on Section 233
of the Reimbursement Manual as a
guide in deciding when to reimburse allowable refinancing costs.
The Hospital contends that
Medicare regulations require that
GAAPs be used in reporting reimbursable refinancing costs. When
GAAPs are used for this purpose,
the parties agree that the reimbursable costs of refinancing were
properly reported by the Hospital
as having accrued in 1985. From
this reporting requirement, the
Hospital argues that the Department must reimburse all such
reported costs for the year in which
they were incurred and not by
spreading those costs over a period
of years as Section 233 requires. In
sum, it is Guernsey's position that
the GAAPs control both the manner in which reimbursable refinancing costs must be reported by
health-care providers and when
reimbursement for those costs
must by made by the Department.
(Continued on page 57)
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Guernsey closes by focusing on the
relationship between Section 233
and the Medicare reimbursement
regulations. To the extent that
Section 233 requires amortization of
reimbursable refinancing costs,
Guernsey argues that Section 233
alters existing regulations that do
not require amortization. Thus, the
Hospital urges that the amortization
of refinancing costs required under
Section 233 is inconsistent with the
plain language of Medicare's costreimbursement regulations. As
noted above, the Hospital claims
that those regulations, which adhere
to GAAPs, require full reimbursement in the same year that GAAPs
require refinancing costs to be
reported as having been incurred.
According to the Hospital, to the
extent that Section 233 has been
used by the Department to require
amortization of refinancing costs,
Section 233 constitutes a legislative
rule, not a mere interpretation of
existing and lawfully promulgated
rules. Therefore, the hospital concludes that the Sixth Circuit correctly held that the Department's
reliance on Section 233 was improper because, as a legislative rule, it
had not been adopted in compliance
with the public notice and comment
procedures of the APA.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case involves rather arcane
accounting and legal issues requiring interpretation of complex
Medicare health-care provider reimbursement regulations in the context of debt refinancing. If the
Supreme Court decides in favor of
Guernsey, the Secretary remains

free to utilize her rule-making
authority under the APA to adopt a
rule that clearly states that GAAPs
do not apply in debt-refinancing situations and that the reimbursement
of such costs must be amortized,
regardless of when they are reported
or incurred. If the Secretary prevails, no further Department action
is needed to require health-care
providers to accept reimbursement
of refinancing costs over a period
of years.
Of broader significance is the
possibility that the Court may provide helpful clarification for lower
federal courts regarding judicial
review of an administrative agency's
interpretation of its own regulations.
Moreover, the Court may amplify its
rather sparse decisions relating to
the interpretive rules of administrative agencies, clarifying for courts
and litigants how to distinguish
interpretive from substantive rules.
For Donna Shalala, Secretary of
Health and Human Services
(Counsel of Record: Drew S. Days,
III, Solicitor General; Department of
Justice, Washington, DC 20530;
(202) 514-2217:
1. The Secretary's Medicare regulations do not mandate provider reimbursement according to generally
accepted accounting principles and,
thus, the Secretary could require
refinancing costs to be amortized.
2. Section 233 of the Secretary's
Provider Reimbursement Manual is
a valid interpretive rule for purposes
of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act.

For Guernsey Memorial Hospital
(Counsel of Record: Scott W. Taebel;
Brickler & Eckler; 100 South Third
Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215; (614)
227-2300:
1. The plain language of Medicare
regulations require reimbursement
of refinancing costs in the year in
which they were incurred and
reported under generally accepted
accounting principles.
2. Section 233 is a invalid legislative
rule because it has the force and
effect of law and was not promulgated in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act.

AMIcus BRIEFS
In support of Guernsey Memorial
Hospital
Joint brief of the American
Hospital Association, the Federation
of American Health Systems, the
California Association of Hospitals
and Health Systems, and the Texas
Hospital Association (Counsel of
Record: Robert A. Klein; Weissburg
& Aronson; 2049 Century Park East,
Suite 3200, Los Angeles, CA 90067;
(310) 277-2223);
Joint brief of 28 hospitals participating in St. John Hosp. v. Shalala,
a case pending before the Sixth
Circuit and 14 hospitals involved in
an appeal pending before the
Department of Health and Human
Services Provider Reimbursement
Review Board (Counsel of Record:
William G. Christopher; Honigman,
Miller, Schwartz and Cohn; 2290
First National Bank Building, Detroit,
MI 48226; (313) 256-7800);
Mother Frances Hospital and
Osteopathic Medical Center of
Texas (Counsel of Record: Dan M.
Peterson; Fulbright and Jaworski;
801 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,
Washington, DC 20004;
(202) 662-0200).
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